A document containing meeting minutes transcribed during the British Prime
Minister's meeting on July 23, 2002
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As originally reported in the The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson,
John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair
Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be
shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's
regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was
likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack,
probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US.
Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among
the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in
attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove
Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and
WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The
NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material
on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on
3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air
campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30
days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air
campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air
campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and
Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important,
but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role
in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to
put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the
most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the
timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It
seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the
timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his
neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or
Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN
weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of
force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base
for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence,
humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not
be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be
difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if
Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were
linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were
different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were
right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the
military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military
plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable.
The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if
Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam
could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan
unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests
converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite
US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue
to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when
he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military
involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US
did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for
the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military
action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm
decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of
options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be
spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign
and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN
inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the
region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal
advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
